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Returning Home and Restoring Trust:
A Legal Framework for Federally NonRecognized Tribal Nations to Acquire
Ancestral Lands in Fee Simple
Taino J. Palermo*
ABSTRACT

There is a special trust relationship between the federal government and American Indian tribes, referred to as the “trust responsibility.” However, it is difficult to frame the scope of this relationship. One narrow interpretation is the trust instrument
formed when the federal government takes tribal land in fee simple,
to manage for the benefit of the tribe. This result leaves tribes with
a possessory interest unique only to Indians—the sole right of occupancy. However, access to this narrow interpretation of the trust
relationship is limited to tribes with federal recognition. As a result, non-recognized tribes do not have a legal pathway under
American Indian law to petition the federal government to secure
tribal lands in trust. Contributing to the complexity of this issue,
many federally non-recognized tribes are recognized elsewhere
with indisputable land ties. Nonetheless, without federal recognition, there is no ability to reclaim ancestral real property under U.S.
law. In response, this Article proposes a legal framework for the
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fee simple trust acquisition of tribal lands by non-recognized tribes
to assert their inherent right to self-governance, to control their ancestral lands, and to operate as an independent sovereign nation.
Part I of this Article will provide a brief legal history on the formation of the trust relationship between the federal government
and tribes. Part II will propose a legal scheme for tribes to take
their ancestral lands into trust and exercise their full sovereignty
with complete control and ownership rights over their ancestral
real property. Part III of this Article will discuss two key concessions to consider when applying the proposed legal concept. The
Article will conclude with recommendations for strengthening the
framework moving forward.
INTRODUCTION

A special trust relationship exists between the federal government and American Indian tribes, referred to by the United States
Supreme Court as the “trust responsibility.”1 However, it is difficult to frame the scope of this relationship. Most broadly, the trust
relationship entails legal duties, moral obligations, and expectancies that arise from dealings between the federal government and
tribal nations.2 Most narrowly, the trust relationship refers to the
legal relationship created between parties under the formation of a
trust where the United States serves as trustee and tribal nations
as beneficiaries.3 Applying this narrower interpretation, the federal government takes tribal lands into trust, via treaty4 or statute,5 as trustees with fee simple possessory interest over the tribal
lands. The result of which leaves tribal nations with the sole right
to occupancy as their possessory interest.6 This limited possessory
1. See United States v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 564 U.S. 162, 175 (2011)
(citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 255 (1983)); United States v.
Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 490 (2003) (acknowledging the “general trust relationship” that exists between the federal government and Indian tribes); Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“[T]he government has
longstanding and substantial trust obligations to Indians.”).
2. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 35 (6th
ed. 2015).
3. Id.
4. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 30 (4th ed.
2012).
5. See 25 U.S.C. § 5108.
6. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587 (1823).
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interest has, and continues to be, a major point of contention between tribes and the federal government.7 To further complicate
matters, the special trust relationship only applies to federally recognized tribes. Tribes not federally recognized prior to 1934 are
precluded from receiving recognition.8 Moreover, the Department
of the Interior, the federal agency responsible for all Indian affairs
and land management, expressly stated that acknowledgment of
tribal existence by the Department “[i]s a prerequisite to the protection, services and benefits of the Federal Government available
to those that qualify as Indian tribes . . . .”9 Thus, as it stands today, there is no legal pathway for non-recognized tribes to petition
the federal government to take tribal lands into trust.
In response, this Article will propose a legal framework for the
fee simple trust acquisition of tribal lands by non-recognized tribes,
who can then assert their inherent right to self-governance and control over their ancestral lands and operate as an independent sovereign nation. A tribe that lacks federal government recognition
does not necessarily mean that the tribe is not recognized elsewhere. However, without federal recognition, non-recognized tribal
members are effectively dual-nationals—citizens of both the United
States and their sovereign tribal nations. To that end, the proposed
framework’s legal authorities derive from U.S. property, trust, and
American Indian law, as well as international human rights law.
Part I of this Article will provide a brief legal history on the
formation of the trust relationship between the federal government
and tribes. By framing Indians as “savages” and “heathens” unfit
to retain possession of their lands,10 Congress and the Supreme
Court lawfully justified the taking of tribal land.11 For the privilege
of a tribe’s ability to engage with the federal government on any
land-related matters, the tribe must first be “recognized” by the

7. See generally Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Tee-HitTon Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); Northwestern Bands of
Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335 (1945); Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
8. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 382–83 (2009).
9. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2(a) (2020).
10. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 577, 590.
11. See generally General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49105, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–342).
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federal government.12 Therefore, non-recognized tribes have been
left with no legal pathway to petition the federal government to
take tribal lands into trust under existing American Indian law.
As a solution, Part II proposes a legal framework for tribes to
take their ancestral lands into trust and exercise their full sovereignty with complete control and ownership rights over their land.
Citing the federal and international legal authorities, the application of the proposed framework navigates the lawful boundaries of
dual-nationalism—where a non-recognized tribal member, otherwise considered an American citizen, is also a citizen of a functioning sovereign tribal nation that may be recognized locally or internationally but is otherwise considered a foreign nation to the
United States. This dual-national status is unique to tribes with
functioning governments indigenous to the United States,13 and as
a result, the proposed framework is only applicable in this context.
Finally, Part III of this Article will discuss two key concessions
to consider when applying the proposed legal framework. These
concessions include the financing for, and availability of, tribal
lands for purchase; and the refusal of the U.S. to be bound by international legal authorities.
I.

THE HISTORY OF THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP

Chief Justice John Marshall provided the initial legal framing
of the trust relationship between the federal government and tribes
in his series of Supreme Court opinions known as the “Marshall
Trilogy.”14 In Johnson v. M’Intosh, Justice Marshall described Indians as “savages,” unfit to retain possessory title of their lands.
And because Indians were considered conquered, “[c]onquest gives
a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny.”15 As tribes
continued to assert their sovereign status and protect tribal lands
from American expansionism, Justice Marshall issued the trilogy’s

12. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.2(a).
13. “Indigenous to the United States” refers to the continental United
States as well as territories. See Indigenous Peoples in the United States, INT’L
WORK GRP. FOR INDIGENOUS AFFS., https://www.iwgia.org/en/usa.html
[https://perma.cc/U7UU-B8UJ] (last visited Nov. 12, 2021).
14. See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
15. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 588.
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second opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.16 In that opinion,
Justice Marshall described Indian tribes as “domestic dependent
nations” that exist “in a state of pupilage” whose “relations with the
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”17 And
finally, Justice Marshall’s opinion in Worcester v. Georgia sent a
clear signal that only the federal government can deal with Indian
tribes and that state law has “no force” within tribal territories.18
The “Marshall Trilogy” fortified the lawful taking of tribal
lands and established a new possessory interest only available to
Indian tribes: the right of occupancy. This right of occupancy for
Indian tribes is a legal possessory interest only the “discovering” or
“conquering” sovereign can extinguish,19 and is evidence of a legal
byproduct of the trust relationship between the federal government
and Indian tribes. Over a century later, the legal doctrine of title
by conquest and the exclusive right to occupancy of Indian tribes
over their ancestral lands continues to be cited by the Supreme
Court.20 The “Marshall Trilogy” opinions, coupled with rapid territorial expansion, prompted Congress to pass the Indian Removal
Act.21 The Act gave the federal government authority to negotiate
with tribes for their removal west of the of Mississippi River and
launched an entire era in federal Indian policy focused on the dispossession of tribal lands.
By entering treaties with the federal government, often under
duress, coercion, or force, rather than by free will, tribes relocated
to reservations in an effort to retain their tribal communities and
culture.22 Under this new model, the federal government acquired
lands in trust for tribes to exclusively occupy.23 However, to cap
the number of tribes eligible for land reservations, Congress passed
25 U.S.C.A. § 71 in 1871 which precluded any other tribal nation
16. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1.
17. Id. at 10.
18. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 520.
19. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 585.
20. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 204 n.1
(2005).
21. Indian Removal Act, Pub. L. No. 21-148, 4. Stat. 411 (1830).
22. See Doug Kiei, Hidden in Plain View: Native Strategies of Resistance
to Indian Removal, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/articles/hidden-inplain-view.htm [https://perma.cc/SGP4-YQKS] (last visited Nov. 11, 2021).
23. Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 5, 48 Stat. 984, 985
(1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5105, 5108).
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from forming a treaty with the federal government.24 Thus, reservations established after 1871 were created statutorily or by executive order, until the latter method was eventually ended by Congress in 1919.25 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Carcieri
v. Salazar reaffirmed the federal government’s desire to no longer
acknowledge Indian tribes, and as a result, it had no obligation to
address land claims or issue land rights with non-recognized
tribes.26
In that case, the Supreme Court held that tribes must demonstrate that they were “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934 to qualify
for the government taking of land into trust under the first definition of “Indian” in the Indian Reorganization Act.27 In so doing, the
Court took aim at the critical ability of tribes to amass a land base
by splitting tribes into two factions: tribes whose history readily
demonstrates they were under federal jurisdiction in 1934, and
tribes who, due to a variety of reasons, face difficulty in making
such a showing.28 The Carcieri holding is a critical stop-gap for
non-recognized tribes who want to reclaim their ancestral lands. It
is in response to these historical and current barriers to recognition
and tribal land rights that the proposed legal framework aims to
address.
With the era of Indian removal nearing its end, Congress
spawned the next era of destructive federal Indian land policy with
the passing of the Dawes Act of 1887.29 Also known as the General
Allotment Act, the Dawes Act definitively eroded Indian land rights
by allotting parcels of Indian land to individual Indians in order to
break up landholding tribal nations.30 The Dawes Act was also intended to convert possessory interests in real property from that of
aboriginal title under American Indian law, to that of fee simple
title under standard American property law.31 After twenty-five

24. 25 U.S.C. § 71.
25. 43 U.S.C. § 150.
26. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 382–83 (2009).
27. Id. at 388.
28. Bethany C. Sullivan & Jennifer L. Turner, Enough Is Enough: Ten
Years of Carcieri v. Salazar, 40 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 37, 39 (2019).
29. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-105, 24 Stat.
388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–342).
30. § 1, 24 Stat. at 388.
31. § 5, 24 Stat. at 389.
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years, the title would convert, and the land would be free of all encumbrances.32 In doing so, the Indian allottee would become a U.S.
citizen subject to state intestacy laws.33
Although the allotment era was responsible for the destruction
of tribal communities and eroded their lawful rights to their ancestral lands, the Dawes Act itself is significant for another reason.
The Dawes Act was the first and only time a legislative effort was
made to convert one form of property interest into another, higher
form of possessory interest. This is significant because the Dawes
Act serves as legislative precedent for the ability to convert possessory interest under one body of law into a different possessory interest under another body of law. It is on this principle of lawful
conversion of legal possessory interest that the proposed legal
framework draws its legislative historical roots.
The historical formation of the trust relationship between the
federal government and tribes has been undoubtedly destructive,
in general, to tribal communities and territories, but even more so
for non-recognized tribes. Without recognition, most tribes cannot
operate within the unique trust relationship structure and therefore are afforded very few, if any, rights under American Indian
law.34 However, just because a tribe is not federally recognized
statutorily as “Indian,” a tribe could nonetheless be recognized by
the surrounding state or by an international body.35 Moreover, a
tribe could meet federal common law requirements36 for recognition
and, at a minimum, enjoy the same sovereign immunity from suit
as that of recognized tribes.37 But neither form of supplemental
recognition satisfy the recognition status required to access Section
5 of the IRA, allowing tribes to petition the federal government to
take fee simple possession over tribal lands in trust for the benefit

32. Id.
33. See id.
34. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., GUIDE TO WORKING WITH
NON-FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED TRIBES IN THE SECTION 106 PROCESS 3 (2018).
35. See id. at 1–2.
36. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901) (federal common
law requirements for recognition include ethnicity, continuity, leadership, and
established territory).
37. See Gristede’s Foods, Inc. v. Unkechuage Nation, 660 F. Supp. 2d 442,
476 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Koke v. Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians of Mont.,
Inc., 68 P.3d 814, 817 (Mont.2003).
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by right of exclusive occupancy for the tribe38—the narrowest interpretation of the trust relationship. It is this specific aspect of the
trust relationship, the actual trust instrument, that the proposed
legal framework is modeled after. The concept of converting title
status from an aboriginal title to fee simple is critical to the framework’s design because in application, the “trust responsibility” owed
to tribes from the federal government would instead transfer to the
tribes being responsible to and for themselves exclusively.
II. THE PROPOSED LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The proposed legal framework is based on the legal theory of
that which has not been taken away remains.39 In other words,
tribes that never entered treaties with the United States in exchange for right of occupancy possessory interests in real property,
(and are not federally recognized as a result) were never dispossessed of their inherent rights to ownership and control over their
ancestral lands.40 The inherent right to ancestral lands for nonrecognized tribes is also supported by international legal instruments such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP);41 the American Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (ADRIP);42 the American Declaration

38. 25 U.S.C. § 5108.
39. FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §
4.01[1][a], at 207 (Neil Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012) (“Perhaps the most
basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of decisions, is that those
powers lawfully vested in an Indian nation are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished.”); see also United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (“The powers of Indian tribes are, in general,
‘inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.’
. . . Like all sovereign bodies, they then had the inherent power to prescribe
laws for their members and to punish infractions of those laws.”) (emphasis in
original); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973)
(“It must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Government.”).
40. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
41. G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007).
42. Org. of Am. States, American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, AG/RES. 2888 (XLVI-O/16) (June 15, 2016).

2022]

AN UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH

313

on the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration);43 and by
international institutions like the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR).44 Grounded in a theory that is supported
by federal and international legal authorities, the proposed framework includes a critical presumption of the federally non-recognized
tribes to which it applies.
For the proposed framework to pass legal muster, the tribe applying the framework must already function as an independent sovereign nation with some form of recognition other than federal
recognition.45 In other words, the framework is best applied by
tribes with a functioning government, bound by their own constitution, laws, or codes, and maintain a dispute resolution or judiciary
system to uphold and enforce their law. Having such foundational
institutions in place, prior to applying the proposed legal framework, signals to the federal government and the international community that the tribal nation already intends to hold itself out as
an independent nation capable of self-governance, commerce, and
trade as any other sovereign. Moreover, recognition of the tribe in
some form or fashion is a necessary presumption of the applied
framework because the tribe’s historical and ancestral ties to the
lands in question must be indisputable.46
Indigeneity is the key aspect by which this framework can be
applied. Therefore, it is critical for the tribe applying the framework to be recognized by other tribes, international entities, or under common law showing evidence of ethnicity/indigeneity, continuity of the tribe’s existence, and established leadership and
territoriality.47 These presumptions are also critical to the tribe’s

43. Inter-Am. Comm’n on H.R., American Declaration of The Rights and
Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948).
44. See
What
is
the
IACHR?,
ORG.
OF
AM.
STATES,
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp (last visited on Oct, 8, 2021).
45. See About FANA, FED’N OF ABORIGINAL NATIONS OF THE AMS.,
https://fana.global/about-fana (last visited Oct. 8, 2021) (describing the criteria
needed to have standing as a member of FANA). For a link to the Tribal Registry form of the Taino People, see Tribal Registry, UNITED CONFEDERATION OF
TAINO PEOPLE, https://www.uctp.org/tribal-registry-taino-people (last visited
Oct. 8, 2021). See generally Indigenous Peoples, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF
ECON. & SOC. AFFS., https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/
[https://perma.cc/DH5X-8VD7] (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
46. 25 C.F.R. § 292.12(b)–(c) (2020).
47. 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(a)–(f) (2020).
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ability to exercise the concept of dual-nationalism as tribal and
American citizens. This is because when applying the framework,
tribes will retain the highest form of property ownership under
American law, while also prohibiting federal oversight of their
lands and independent sovereigns and will need international legal
and political support to do so. Therefore, tribes that meet these
presumptive requirements will be in the best possible position to
effectively apply the proposed legal framework.
As federally non-recognized tribes, American Indian law, and
therefore limitation on tribes possessing fee simple title over their
lands, does not apply under this framework.48 Therefore, a nonrecognized tribe can lawfully purchase ancestral real property as a
bona fide purchaser for value (BPFV) and transfer the property into
an inter vivos trust. As trust managers, and under their inherent
legal right to govern themselves,49 tribes can securely protect their
ancestral lands as sovereign nations exercising jurisdiction over
themselves. And by putting the global community on notice of its
declared status as an independent land-based governmental entity,
a tribal nation could theoretically maintain its fee simple possessory interest in its ancestral lands, as well as its universal right to
control its ancestral lands. In doing so, tribes can shift federal oversight to exclusive tribal oversight.
In practice, the legal framework operates as follows:
(1) The tribe, or an agent acting on their behalf, purchases
and acquires title to their ancestral land in fee simple as
the BPFV. [It is important to note that] [i]ndians and
tribes can obtain fee land by purchasing it, inheriting it, or
receiving it as a gift just as everyone else can.50 However,
acquiring title in fee simple came at the expense of losing
federal recognition and falling out of the trust relationship,51 the result of which meant not having the federal
protections and rights that flow from recognition under

48. 25 C.F.R. § 151.1 (2020).
49. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832); see also G.A. Res. 61/295,
supra note 41, at 8.
50. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 165 (4th ed.
2012).
51. See id. at 35.
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American Indian law. This framework helps tribal nations
use that disadvantage to their advantage.
(2) The BFPV transfers the real property gratuitously to
the tribal nation by forming an inter vivos foreign trust.52
As the BFPV, they can gratuitously transfer the real property to the tribal nation in trust.53 In doing so, this framework would place the BFPV as the trust settlor; the tribal
council, or functional equivalent, as the trust manager(s);
and the tribal members serving as an ascertainable class of
beneficiaries.54 However, this framework suggests the creation of a foreign trust in particular; any trust can be
deemed a foreign trust so long as it meets the requirements
of a validly executed trust.55
(3) A foreign trust is a trust that fails either the “control”
test or the “court” test under federal law. The “court test”
is satisfied if an American court has “jurisdiction to supervise the trust’s administration.”56 The foreign trust formed
under the proposed framework would fail this test because
as a separate sovereign and fee simple title holder, only a
tribal court would have jurisdiction to supervise the trust’s
administration.57 The “control test” requires that one or
more U.S. persons have the ability to render substantial
control or decision-making authority over the trust.58 The
foreign trust formed under the proposed framework would
fail this test as well because as dual-nationals, all trustrelated stakeholders would assert their tribal citizenship
status, not their U.S. citizenship status, for all decisionmaking authority over trust matters. Thus, the formation
of the foreign trust instrument created by the gratuitous
transfer of ancestral real property from the BFPV, for the
benefit of tribal citizens as non-U.S. third-party
52. See 2 FREDERICK K. HOOPS ET AL., FAMILY ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE §
31:5(a), (d) Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2020).
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 10(b) (AM. L. INST. 2001).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 3 (AM. L. INST. 2001).
55. See HOOPS ET AL., supra note 52, § 31:5(a).
56. Id.
57. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-7(a)(1)–(2) (2021).
58. See HOOPS ET AL., supra note 52, § 31:5(a)(1)–(9).
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beneficiaries, is valid and income generated from non-U.S.
sources is exempt from federal taxation.59
(4) As fee simple title holders—the highest form of possessory interest in real property under U.S. law—and as a selfgoverning sovereign tribal nation, the tribe sends constructive notice to the federal government, as well as international institutions, declaring their independent sovereign
nation status. The constructive notice will make clear that
the tribe has reclaimed possessory interests over their ancestral lands under federal and international law, as well
as under their own tribal law. Constructive notice would be
issued by the tribal nation-trust managers to the federal
government and the international community such as the
United Nations (U.N.) and the Organization of American
States (OAS). The intent of the constructive notice is to
declare the tribal nation’s sovereign status and lawful application of federal60 and international instruments61 to
possess and secure their ancestral lands and govern themselves.
In theory, the application of the proposed framework could expose a new legal space where property law, trust and estates law,
American Indian law, and international human rights law intersect. The proposed framework allows for indigenous communities,
as BFPVs and trust administrators with jurisdictional oversight, to
reclaim their ancestral lands that were once taken from them under
a foreign system. Under this legal framework, grounded in legal
theory and taking key presumptions into consideration, a tribe applying the proposed legal framework can not only return home to
where they once came, but can also retain complete control over its

59. GRAYSON M.P. MCCOUCH, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES,
TRUSTS, AND BENEFICIARIES IN A NUTSHELL 353–54 (2017).
60. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,
498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 323 (1978);
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1973);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832); NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan,
276 F.3d 1186, 1192 (10th Cir. 2002); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d
89, 91 (8th Cir. 1956); COHEN, supra note 39, § 15.01, at 995.
61. Org. of Am. States [OAS] Charter art. 3(b); G.A. Res. 61/295, supra
note 41, at 2–3; American Declaration of The Rights and Duties of Man, supra
note 43, pmbl.
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land and engage with the world as an independent sovereign nation.
III. CONCESSIONS TO CONSIDER

When considering the application of the proposed legal framework there are two key concessions worth discussing. These concessions include the financing and availability of tribal lands for
purchase; and the refusal of the United States to be bound by international legal authorities. The availability of a particular tribe’s
ancestral lands for purchase from the free market is an obvious initial hurdle to executing the proposed legal framework. At a minimum, any given tribe’s historical territorial boundaries likely span
across multiple municipalities, states, and jurisdictions, all with
their own governing property and real estate laws.62 To that end,
to reclaim a tribe’s ancestral territory in its entirety would be extremely challenging and likely require a scattered development approach purchasing parcels within the tribal boundaries as they become available over time. Moreover, the title that may be available
for purchase may not be a title with fee simple possessory interest.
This framework relies upon a tribe’s financial or fundraising capabilities to secure the required financing to purchase their ancestral
lands. However, assuming the ancestral lands are available, and
financing is secured, a tribe could purchase their ancestral real
property as a BFPV recognized under United States property law.
As functioning tribal nations native to the lands they also retain fee
simple title over, the have both the highest form of legal possessory
interest in real property under United States law, and the highest
form of inherent right to ancestral real property under international law. This legal framework exposes these parallel forms of
real property interests as an indigenous American Indian with fee
simple ownership over ancestral lands can only raise.
A second critical, and arguably the most important, concession
to consider is the United States’ refusal to be bound by international legal authorities. In a death penalty case, a United States
national on death row in Texas petitioned the IACHR on grounds
that certain evidence admitted violated his rights to life, equal protection, and due process afforded to him in the American
62. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, TRIBAL NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES:
AN INTRODUCTION 8 (2019).
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Declaration.63 The IACHR’s report stated that under the American
Declaration, the United States violated the prohibition on the arbitrary use of capital punishment and denied the defendant’s rights
to a fair trial and due process of the law.64 The Seventh Circuit
declined to stay the defendant’s execution nonetheless, and described the American Declaration as an “aspirational document.”65
Moreover, Congress has yet to statutorily adopt any portion of the
UNDRIP or ADRIP that the proposed framework relies upon.66
Statutory adoption of UNDRIP or ADRIP articles related to property ownership and control are crucial to future development of this
framework. This is evident in the case, Medellin v. Texas, where
the Court found that an international court’s decision is not enforceable in United States courts in the absence of any statutory authority enacted by Congress.67 And although the United States has
signed onto to the Organization of American States, and United Nations charters and declarations referenced above, the United States
has yet to ratify either.68 This refusal to be bound by international
legal authorities affords the United States the right to deny a tribe’s
assertions to fully self-govern their ancestral real property above
and beyond the legal parameters of fee simple ownership under
United States law. However, there is one documented case in which
the United States defended its position against indigenous claimants challenging the federal government over uses of their tribe’s
traditional land.
In Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States69 the IACHR issued
the following statement in their opinion:
63. Garza v. United States, Case 12.243, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 52/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 2 (2001).
64. Id. ¶ 3.
65. Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 2001).
66. See Gale Courey Toensing, House Resolution Falls Short of Unqualified UN Declaration Adoption, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://indiancountrytoday.com/archive/house-resolution-falls-short-of-unqualified-un-declaration-adoption [https://perma.cc/3E8M-5EBX].
67. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523 (2008).
68. See American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra
note 42, at 47; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFS., https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples.html [https://perma.cc/NM6A-PKLF] (last visited Nov. 12, 2021).
69. Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2002).
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[W]here property and user rights of indigenous peoples
arise from rights existing prior to the creation of a state,
[indigenous peoples have the right to] recognition by that
state of the permanent and inalienable title of indigenous
peoples relative thereto and to have such title changed only
by mutual consent between the state and respective indigenous peoples when they have full knowledge and appreciation of the nature or attributes of such property. This also
implies the right to fair compensation in the event that
such property and user rights are irrevocably lost.70
Nonetheless, the United States has yet to adopt the ruling of
the IACHR in Dann.71 But the larger importance is that the international legal community is willing to engage and support actions
brought against the United States for wrongs against indigenous
Americans. And should the federal government challenge an application of the proposed framework by any tribe, the IACHR can provide tribes a legal forum to hold the United States accountable. It
is important to note that any one nation’s laws does not supersede
international law, even if that nation’s laws takes jurisdictional
precedence over an international law.72
CONCLUSION

“Real property holdings are the single most important economic resource of most Indian tribes.”73 Land ownership allows for
the preservation of distinct nationhood, making it central to tribal
sovereignty.74 In the United States, the taking of Indian land was
how tribal sovereignty was systematically disassembled. By codifying superiority in law, the United States created land reservations and a federal recognition process to tell Indians who they were
and where they could exist under the guise of “agreement” by treaties—many of which were often abrogated as the law also allowed

70. Id. ¶ 130.
71. See Response of the Government of the United States, Dann v. United
States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2002).
72. See Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004
I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 27–28 (Mar. 31).
73. COHEN, supra note 39, § 15.01, at 995.
74. See id.
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for.75 As terms of the treaty, and out of the need for self-preservation of a tribal community, tribes were assigned reserved lands that
was theirs, but not fully theirs.
Those tribes now federally recognized have a lawful status allowing them to petition the federal government to take more lands
into trust for the benefit of their tribes, albeit still with limited possessory interest.76 However, there are many tribes with no documented history of land dispossession because they did not enter into
treaty terms with the United States.77 Therefore, the legal theory
underscoring the proposed framework is that barring any actual
documentation of any dispossession of tribal lands (i.e. via treaty
for reserved lands or an allotment agreement to convert title), the
inherent and legal rights to the lands that were never given away
still remain.
This Article proposes a legal framework that would allow a
tribe to assert those rights that still remain lawfully and reclaim
their ancestral tribal lands in the highest form of possessory interest under United States law. And protect that possessory interest
in real property by placing it in a trust for the benefit of the tribal
community. This framework operates around the restraints of the
American-made limited right to occupancy only applicable to Indians. Michael Blumm describes this Indian property right as a “fee
simple [that is] subject to the government’s right of preemption” or,
alternatively, as a “fee simple with a partial restraint on alienation.”78 In response, the proposed legal framework removes all restraints on the Indian’s right to their ancestral real property.
Non-recognized tribes operate outside of the trust relationship
between the federal government and tribes the government formally confers recognition upon. As such, non-recognized tribes cannot petition the federal government to take additional tribal lands
into trust. However, even if non-recognized tribes were allowed to

75. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566–567 (1903) (“When,
therefore, treaties were entered into between the United States and a tribe of
Indians it was never doubted that the power to abrogate existed in Congress
. . . .”). Id. at 566.
76. See COHEN, supra note 39, § 3.02[3], at 134.
77. See id. § 3.02[3], at 135.
78. Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal Title,
Tribal Sovereignty, and their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources Policy in Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV. 713, 741 & n.183 (2004).
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petition the federal government, approval of the petition would give
the federal government fee simple possessory rights over the tribal
lands and defeat the framework’s purpose. Instead, federally nonrecognized tribes can purchase their ancestral lands as fee-simple
title holders outright, transfer the real property into a foreign trust,
and maintain both the highest form of possessory interest under
United States law, as well as their inherent universal right to selfgovernance over their ancestral lands.
The concepts of title conversion and dual-nationalism are not
foreign to the American legal system, nor under the narrower area
of American Indian Law. However, the proposed legal framework
addresses the barriers and limitations to Indian property rights
from a new and unexplored position—being a citizen of two fully
separate sovereign nations of the same geographic territory in the
twenty-first century. In its fullest realization, the proposed legal
framework attempts to restore the nation-to-nation relationship between the United States and Indian tribes and restore the trust
missing from the existing “trust relationship.”

